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I
INTRODUCTION: WHO’S AFRAID OF POLITICAL COURTS?
The involvement of international courts in highly divisive political issues is
generally seen as a high-risk course of action for the respective court but also for
the conflict in question. Violent inter-and intrastate conflicts are of a megapolitical nature per definition: They concern the very existence of states and often
result in fundamental divisions within the political community. Over the last
seventy years, international courts have developed a significant, diverse, and
wide-ranging practice of litigation of violent conflicts1 that is no longer
constrained to traditional state-to-state dispute settlement.2 In the 21st century,
individuals affected by violent conflicts can take recourse to human rights courts,
while perpetrators face justice before international criminal tribunals. In the
increased institutionalization of international law in the post-Cold war era, the
judicialization of peace and security matters has been a focal point for the project
of a rule-based world order.3
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1. See generally Christian J. Tams, International Courts and Tribunals and Violent Conflict, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GLOBAL SECURITY 735 (Robin Geiß & Nils
Melzer eds., 2021) (discussing the variety of adjudication provided by international courts).
2. See generally Dapo Akande, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Maintenance of
International Peace, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. (1996) (outlining the International Court of Justice
and its contributions to international peace).
3. See Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Laurence R. Helfer, Theorizing the
Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 449, 458–59 (2019); see also Courtney
Hillebrecht, Alexandra Huneeus & Sandra Borda, The Judicialization of Peace, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 279,
316–18 (2018). See generally Eric C. Ip & Giselle T.C. Yuen, Judging Wars: The International Politics of
Humanitarian Adjudication, 3 CORNELL INT’L AFFS. REV. (2010) (highlighting the influence
international courts have had on modern conflicts).
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Yet, the more international courts have become involved in these conflicts,
the more criticism has arisen about their involvement.4 Critics fear that
judicialization will rather increase political division instead of mediating it and
might contribute to renewed hostilities instead of securing or stabilizing peace.5
Individual reparation and restitution awarded by human rights tribunals long
after the violence had occurred might reopen old wounds,6 while court
involvement in international criminal law might also provoke a prolongation of
war because the threat of prosecution prevents responsible power holders to give
up office.7 With the demise of liberal internationalism and the re-emergence of
geopolitical violent conflicts,8 the project of conflict litigation finds itself at a
crossroad.
At the same time, the delegation of conflict-related issues to international
courts also raises distinctive practical concerns for those courts. This includes
organizational backlog, rising budgetary pressures, increased risk of
politicization and, in the most extreme cases, backlash against international
courts.9 This has provoked a renewed debate on the negative consequences of
conflict-jurisprudence to the institutional authority of international courts, which
4. See generally HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
PEACE (1948) (proposing a pragmatic approach to international relations that prioritizes
maximizing the interests of individual nations); E. H. CARR, TWENTY YEAR’S CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939) (providing a classic realist
critique of utopian cooperation as being hindered by survival interests).
5. For a roundtable discussion demonstrating this is also of concern to international judges and
prosecutors see Preventing and Mitigating Conflicts: Role of International Courts, U.S. INST. OF PEACE
(Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.usip.org/events/preventing-and-mitigating-conflicts-role-internationalcourts [https://perma.cc/5LSN-W3FN].
6. See Megan J. Ballard, Post-Conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical
Foundations, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 462, 492–94 (2010); see also Scott Leckie, Post-Conflict
Reparation, Restitution and Human Rights – Where to Head from Here, 27 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 3, 5–6
(2009).
7. Michael Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International
Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935, 937 (2006); see also Hyeran Jo & Beth Simmons, Can the
International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 445 (2016) (highlighting concerns that
the ICC may aggravate political conflicts); Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC
Intervention, 21 ETHICS AND INT’L AFFS. 179, 189 (2007) (“[T]he ICC, in a quest for effectiveness, may
end up not only undermining its legitimacy but also lending support to violent and anti-democratic
political forces.”).
8. See Tom Ginsburg, Authoritarian International Law?, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 221, 223–24 (2020)
(“This [liberal international] era is now decidedly over, and we may be returning to an era in which
international law is facilitative of authoritarian governance.”); see also Achilles Skordas, The Rise of the
Neo-Hobbesian Age: Thirty Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 79 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT, HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 469, 478 (2019)
(Ger.) (“The Neo-Hobbesian Age is defined by a plurality of conflicts with strong background in global
social forces. There is no end in sight for these conflicts, which bear high levels of risk for the security of
humankind.”); Allen S. Weiner, Authoritarian International Law, the Use of Force, and Intervention, 114
AJIL UNBOUND 220, 221–24 (2020) (discussing the rise of authoritarian governments and the likely
impact on international law).
9. See Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against International
Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT
197, 220 (2018) (“[B]acklash [against international courts] is most often a reaction to new socio-political
or legal developments.”).
AND
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is reflected in several reform processes, for instance on inter-state cases,10
provisional measures,11 and the streamlining of rules of procedure and evidence.12
Those who fear the rise of overly political courts, just as in domestic contexts, call
for even more restrictive international adjudication in situations, which concern
massive systematic human rights abuses, geopolitical interests, or socioeconomic
difficulties. Those issues can be characterized as megapolitical, i.e., they are
highly divisive or polarizing social or political issues.13
Conceptually, we follow the broader definition of mega-politics as proposed
by the special issue editors, namely that “judicialized mega-politics applies
whenever [international courts] are adjudicating legal issues that divide domestic
societies or inter-state relations such that one would anticipate that, whatever the
outcome, important and sizable social or political groups will end up greatly
upset.”14 Conflict litigation is a prime example for a study of mega-politics.
However, as we will discuss in Part II, it takes various forms. From high-profile
mega-political disputes, often taking the form of inter-state cases or the criminal
prosecution of well-known political or military leaders, to medium or low-profile
mega-political disputes pursued by individuals and alleged victims of violent
conflict. Yet, the latter can equally result in significant political pushback, for
instance when the individual case raises questions of mass reparations, requires
the state to adopt general measures, or just sheds light on historical episodes of
violence and questions of responsibility. One must thus assume that every case
relating to a situation of violent conflict before an international court has at least
the potential to become a mega-political dispute.
In contrast to domestic courts, international courts have limited leeway in
dodging political questions, and even less mega-political questions.15 This holds
10. STEERING COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., EFFECTIVE PROCESSING AND RESOLUTION OF CASES
RELATING
TO
INTER-STATE
DISPUTES
(DH-SYSC-IV),
COUNCIL
OF
EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/effective-processing-andresolution-of-inter-state-disputes [https://perma.cc/C2RJ-KMZ4].
11. Press Release, INT’L CT. OF JUST., ADOPTION OF A NEW ARTICLE 11 OF THE RESOLUTION
CONCERNING THE INTERNAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE OF THE COURT, ON PROCEDURES FOR
MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES INDICATED BY THE COURT (Dec.
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/0/000-20201221-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf
21,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/PSF5-5PRX].
12. See generally INDEP. EXPERT REV., Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal
Court
and
the
Rome
Statute
Final
Report
(Sept.
30,
2020),
https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/IER-Final-Report-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q2N-UD5B] (detailing
expert recommendations to make ICC policies more effective and efficient).
13. See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 93, 94 (2008) (defining mega-politics as “matters of outright and utmost political
significance that often define and divide whole polities”) [hereinafter Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of
Mega-Politics]; see also Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLITICS 119, 120 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008)
(discussing the judicialization of mega-politics as “the transfer to courts of contentious issues of an
outright political nature and significance”) [hereinafter Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics].
14. Karen J. Alter and Mikael Rask Madsen, The International Adjudication of Mega-Politics, 84
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, no. 4, 2021, at 1.
15. See Jed Odermatt, Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions before International Courts, 14
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particularly true when they have to adjudicate violent conflicts or in a situation
of post-conflict justice. Indeed, international courts face domestic and
transnational mega-political issues on a daily basis. Their tasks range from
interpreting bilateral treaties on fundamental questions of statehood to
upholding their mandates in sensitive policy areas, like human rights or
international criminal law. They often have been established in response to the
pitfalls of brute international power politics or the absence of national
jurisdictional structures to deal with such issues adequately.
While a clear distinction between the realms of law and politics is already
hard to obtain in most national systems, it is even less present in the global legal
order where an overarching constitutional framework is still not in place.
International courts have to navigate legal constraints and political questions.16
This is particularly difficult in the area of peace and security as it lacks a coherent
institutionalized regime. In particular, with a highly polarized UN Security
Council in need of reform, international adjudication often seems to be the only
viable option for participants and victims of violent conflicts to hold perpetrators
and state actors accountable. Domestic analogies to the rise of political courts are
thus difficult to uphold, and, at least from the perspective of international
relations, often misinterpret the role and function of international courts in the
global order.
As highlighted by the editors of this special issue, the international
adjudication of mega-politics is difficult to avoid and not necessarily harmful for
democracy. State actors deliberately call upon international courts to stabilize
conflict through an impartial third party, to hamper power politics, to allow for
alternative means of conflict management, as well as to communicate to the
international community as a whole the continued validity of shared norms and
principles. But international courts are not primarily thought to bring peace to
warring countries17 nor to deter actors from violating international humanitarian
or human rights law or to decide on the right way for a post-conflict society to
move forward.18
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 221, 222–24 (2018) (observing that adjudication between states is often inherently
political); Martti Koskenniemi, The Function of Law in the International Community: 75 Years After, 79
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 353, 364 (2008) (discussing how international courts address controversies with
political implications). For an argument against the differentiation between level versus political disputes,
the latter allegedly being nonjusticiable before international courts, see generally HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
16. See Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 483, 483–502 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany
eds., 2013) (discussing various political restraints on international courts).
17. See generally KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014) (discussing the influence international courts can have by merely stating what
the law is); ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2014) (highlighting how international courts have gained legitimacy,
and how they can retain it through the public law adjudication model); YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2014) (evaluating the effectiveness of international
courts via goal and outcome comparison).
18. Christian J. Tams, World Courts as Guardians of Peace, 15 GLOB. COOP. RSCH. PAPERS 5, 19–

STEININGER & DEITELHOFF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2021]

AGAINST THE MASTERS OF WAR

1/13/2022 1:42 PM

99

Against this background, we adopt a counter-perspective to the literature on
judicialization and backlash and instead claim that judicialization also poses
opportunities and benefits for the law and practice of conflict resolution.
Discussing the various forms of involving international courts in conflicts (Part
II), we argue that the involvement of international courts slows down conflicts
(Part III), enables the creation of a common space for the contestation of
application and validity of legal norms in the context of the conflict (Part IV),
and provides for the communicative dynamics to create trust (Part V).
Judicial procedures give courts agency in engaging in the stabilization of
normative expectations, the contestation of diverse norm interpretations, the
clarification, and even the creation of new normative frameworks. International
courts do not merely address the concrete litigants but bystanders and the
broader public to reassure them of the validity of specific norms and the legal
system as a whole, thereby diffusing and cultivating legal consciousness.19 In this
sense, judicialization transforms political conflict into legal disputes, which
provide rules for the participation of actors, the acceptance of arguments, and
structures of debate. This does not necessarily end the political conflict but it
opens up alternative routes in managing and containing it.
This article makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to this special
issue. On the one hand, it expands on the focus on judicial authority by returning
to the core of the mega-politics discussion: the dispute over a particular social,
political, or legal problem in front of a judicial body. By moving this dispute to a
judicial forum, actors are purposefully judicializing norm contestation. This type
of institutionalized norm contestation before international courts can positively
impact conflict management in three ways: First of all, the violent politicalmilitary conflict is transformed into a legal dispute. Secondly, the respective
proceedings before international courts allow for norm diffusion and
stabilization. Thirdly, the specific framework of international adjudication also
produces the necessary preconditions for the creation of trust, both within the
parties as well as among the international community.
Empirically, the article adopts an eclectic comparative perspective rather
than focusing on a specific court, as conflict litigation extends over a variety of
judicial fora and the proceedings concerning violent conflicts are innumerable.
This also allows us to take into account different institutional designs and types
of authority, for instance, courts with an arguably low level of authority that still
regularly face disputes concerning violent conflicts such as the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

21 (2016) (describing international courts as dispute resolvers as opposed to routinely resolving postconflict conditions).
19. See Christopher Daase & Nicole Deitelhoff, Justification and Critique of Coercion as World
Order Politics, in JUSTIFICATION OF WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 489, 492–95 (Lothar Brock &
Henrik Simon eds., 2021) (“The current intensification of the normative crisis of international politics
makes a fundamental resetting— or at least an endorsement— of the normative foundations of
international order necessary.”).
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Ultimately, it is important to point out the limits of this contribution: We do
not challenge the difficulties posed by the judicialization of violent conflicts for
international courts. Mega-political issues do bear risks for courts including the
loss of their legitimacy and ultimately their abandonment. It also involves risks
for the respective conflicted societies by provoking new violence or prolonging
existing violence. However, our aim is not to prove an empirical causality in a
binary form, i.e., that the judicialization of mega-politics is good vs. bad for
international courts and political conflicts. At least on matters concerning violent
conflicts, international adjudication is often the only viable alternative to violent
intervention. Hence, we aim to adopt a counterpoint in the current debate and
shine a light on too often overlooked and less analyzed functions of the
judicialization of mega-politics.
II
INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN VIOLENT CONFLICTS
It is difficult to think of a topic which is less mega-political than the question
of war and peace. Violent inter- and intra-state conflicts are of a mega-political
nature by definition. They usually affect a significant number of people, either
implicitly or explicitly, and both their root causes and their consequences are
highly divisive for polities. They are also a crossbreed between international law
and international politics. In both disciplines, the specific definition of what
constitutes a “violent conflict” is marred with significant conceptual turf wars.
For the aim of this paper, a clear definition of violent conflict is not necessary.
On the contrary, it is the process by which quite diverse situations involving
violent conflicts are transformed into legal disputes before international courts
which is of interest to us.
Violent conflicts do not turn up before international courts by accident. Their
judicialization is a purposeful and strategic action. While every violent conflict
can be assumed a mega-political dispute, its judicialization takes different forms
and thus falls squarely into the three categories of cases that raise mega-political
questions proposed by the editors of this special issue. In the history of conflict
litigation, four types of actors have emerged which can initiate judicial
proceedings related to violent conflicts.
First of all, directly affected states can initiate legal proceedings against other
state parties before international courts, which the special editors discuss as interstate driven mega-politics. This emerges from the classical model of international
dispute settlement, where a court has to interpret and apply the respective clauses
of a particular treaty, convention, or declaration to the parties at hand. Questions
on the threshold of support required for the violation of the principle of nonintervention, i.e., the non-interference in domestic affairs, are one of the most
popular categories of conflict litigation at the ICJ.20 However, in the last decade,
20. See Marcelo Kohen, Principle of Non-Intervention 25 Years After the Nicaragua Judgment, 25
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 157, 160 (2012) (discussing the historical development and modern non-intervention
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we have also observed a significant rise of inter-state cases launched at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),21 the International Law of the Sea
(ITLOS),22 as well as regional human rights courts such as the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR).23 The main challenge for launching inter-state
applications consists of procedural requirements, in particular jurisdiction and
admissibility.
Secondly, with the rise of human rights courts in Europe, the Americas, and
Africa, directly affected individuals can also initiate proceedings and hold state
authorities accountable for their loss of life, inhuman treatment or torture, as well
as infringements on the rights of property and private life in the context of violent
conflicts. While those cases most generally fall into the category of sovereigndriven mega-politics, they also overlap with inter-state driven mega-politics. For
instance, at the European Court of Human Rights, a practice has emerged in
which inter-state cases are launched in parallel to a multitude of individual
complaints.24 This increases the role of individuals in situations of violent conflicts
as it allows them to raise specific issues in their interest, for instance on
expropriation and the right to return. Victims of human rights violations in
violent conflicts can thus become independent agents and are enabled to pursue
action, even if this is against the interest of their home state or another state party.
In the European human rights system, well-known examples concern the
violence in Cyprus, Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and, most recently, Armenia and
Azerbaijan.25 However, this does not mean that they are without challenges.
Individual applications related to a broader inter-state conflict are usually not
processed as long as the interstate case is pending. This practice created a massive
backlog of cases at the ECtHR, where in January 2019 seventeen percent of all
applications were individual cases arising out of inter-state conflicts.26 Moreover,
the individuals and communities concerned are at a massive disadvantage vis-à-

applicability).
21. Dapo Akande, Peace Palace Heats Up Again: But Is Inter-State Arbitration Taking Over the
ICJ?, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 17, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-peace-palace-heats-up-again-but-is-interstate-arbitration-overtaking-the-icj/ [https://perma.cc/6D92-AE9W].
22. Dapo Akande, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Gets Busier, EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 2,
2011), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-international-tribunal-for-the-law-of-the-sea-gets-busier/
[https://perma.cc/A22F-4P8R].
23. See Isabella Risini, The Inter-State Application Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Between Collective Enforcement of Human Rights and International Dispute Settlement, in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, at 1, 1–5 (Ser. No. 125, 2018) (discussing the increasing
use of the European Convention on Human Rights’ inter-state application).
24. See Philip Leach, On Inter-State Litigation and Armed Conflict Cases in Strasbourg, 2 EUR.
CONVENTION ON HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 33–34 (2021).
25. STEERING COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., Draft CDDH Report on the Effective Processing and
Resolution of Cases Relating to Inter-State Disputes, COUNCIL OF EUR. 9–10 (2020),
https://rm.coe.int/steering-committee-for-human-rights-cddh-committee-of-experts-on-the-s/16809f059e
[https://perma.cc/4BK3-Y76W].
26. STEERING COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., Contribution of the CDDH to the Evaluation Provided for
by the Interlaken Declaration, COUNCIL OF EUR. 37 (2019), https://rm.coe.int/steering-committee-forhuman-rights-cddh-contribution-of-the-cddh-to-t/1680990d49 [https://perma.cc/MDY9-QXR6].

STEININGER & DEITELHOFF (DO NOT DELETE)

102

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/13/2022 1:42 PM

[Vol. 84: 95

vis inter-state proceedings as their application will only be processed years, or
even decades, after the violation has occurred. In many instances, this means that
the adjudication of individual proceedings related to inter-state conflicts takes
place in deeply divided post-conflict societies when properties have long been
reassigned to different populations and perpetrators have returned to normal life.
In such a situation, judicial proceedings might open up old wounds, require
significant state intervention, and thus threaten a fragile peace. They pose exactly
the domestic challenges envisioned by Ran Hirschl’s analysis of mega-politics.27
The third group of cases concerning violent conflicts is initiated by the
international community at large – either by international organizations
themselves or by state parties not directly affected. While the UN or specialized
agencies have always been able to request advisory opinions on questions related
to violent conflict,28 in the post-Cold war era, international organizations and
third parties have also been actively involved in initiating proceedings against
state parties directly before international courts. In international criminal law, a
UN Security Council resolution established international criminal tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to hold perpetrators accountable in the
1990s and can also refer situations directly to the ICC under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.29 Moreover, the broad proprio motu investigative powers of the ICC
prosecutor can be interpreted as actions in the name of the international
community.
The fourth and final option to initiate proceedings concerns self-referrals
which were rather accidentally invented. This is the most recent option of
involving international courts in the adjudication of violent conflicts and requires
the state, in which a violent conflict takes place or whose nationals had committed
atrocities, to request an international adjudication on its own behalf. According
to Art. 14 (1) of the Rome Statute, “[a] State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a
situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear
to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for
the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be
charged with the commission of such crimes.”30 The voluntary deferral of
jurisdiction to the ICC is a novelty in the history of international criminal law. It
depicts a clear shift from the idea of state sovereignty to the state taking a
complementary role in the prosecution of violent conflicts.
In particular, the early history of the ICC demonstrates the appeal of this new
procedure as a variety of situations concerning massive violent conflicts have
been referred directly to the ICC. Examples include the Democratic Republic of
27. See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics, supra note 13, at 107–12 (noting the risk
of political courts in the domestic arena).
28. See, e.g., Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 66 (July 8), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/93/093-19960708-ADV01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNK5-DEPP].
29. U.N. Charter art. 48, ¶ 2.
30. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 14(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544
(entered into force July 1, 2002).
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the Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic (twice self-referred), Mali,
Comoros, Gabon, and Palestine. Self-referral is a voluntary unilateral act that
demonstrates that countries embroiled in violent conflicts pursue international
adjudication by themselves, even if this runs the risk of their nationals being
prosecuted. It holds the potential to give more legitimacy to the involvement of
international courts in those mega-political conflicts and ensure cooperation with
the respective state authorities.
Yet, the practice of self-referrals paints a more mixed picture. On the one
hand, self-referrals were often motivated by domestic political considerations. In
many instances, the governing authority involved the ICC to try rebel groups and
guerrilla leaders, while hampering the investigation into crimes committed by
state authorities.31 This threatens both the impartiality of the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC as well as its effectiveness in investigating situations of
violent conflict. On the other hand, even though most situations in front of the
ICC were voluntary referrals by the respective state parties, this did not prevent
the criticism of African bias of the Court. In 2016, fifteen years after the Court
had opened its doors, nine out ten situations under investigations concerned
African states, while another four were under preliminary investigation. Not only
did this create significant criticism of bias, Eurocentrism, or flat-out racism of the
ICC, but also led several African countries to turn their back on the ICC and
withdraw from the Rome Statute. Succinctly put by Tor Krever, “[t]he
International Criminal Court does not, and cannot, exist outside politics and its
activities reflect that.”32
While the first and second groups of cases clearly fall into the categories
developed by the editors of this special issue, the third and fourth groups of cases
cannot be easily integrated into the proposed framework. However, the latter
groups also feature high levels of international and domestic politicization and
thus a similar risk of state pushback. The four pathways to the international
judicialization of violent conflicts demonstrate that international courts cannot
avoid being involved in highly decisive mega-political questions concerning war
and peace. This holds true regardless of the temporal connection: whether
international courts are requested to intervene in ongoing situations of violence
and human rights abuses, to prevent the continuous loss of human life and
territorial conquests via provisional measures, or when they have to adjudicate
questions of state responsibility or individual criminal responsibility in the
aftermath of a violent conflict and have to confront not only questions of
transitional justice but also human suffering on a large scale. This also implies
that not every participant in the proceedings will be satisfied with the outcome of
the judicial process.

31. See Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L
AFFS. 179, 191–94 (2007) (discussing the ICC’s targeting of a Ugandan rebel group).
32. Tor Krever, Africa in the Dock: On ICC Bias, CRITICAL LEGAL THINKING (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/10/30/africa-in-the-dock-icc-bias/ [https://perma.cc/JZH6-WHZV].
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So how does this square with the central assumptions of the mega-politics
concept? According to Ran Hirschl, mega-political conflicts are better placed in
the realm of politics.33 This is due to two reasons: substantive and institutional.
On the one hand, Hirschl argues that the substantive issues of the dispute should
not be decided by technocratic expertise, but require the political involvement of
a variety of actors to make the decision democratically legitimate. On the other
hand, he cautions that the involvement of courts in mega-political questions
raises the risk of politicization and challenges to their authority.
In line with this special issue, we argue that both assumptions, the substantive
and the institutional, cannot be transferred easily to the judicialization of violent
conflicts in international politics, and thus the outlook for the authority of
international courts is not as pessimistic. International adjudication as a global
public good is contrary to Hirschl’s view of technocratic domestic courts. To
respond to the first assumption, there is no equivalent of a democratic political
sphere in the international society. The UN General Assembly has no
competence for matters of violent conflict and the model of the UN Security
Council is certainly not more deliberative or democratic than international
adjudication. In contrast to the Security Council, international adjudication
follows agreed-upon rules and standards of due process and allows for the
inclusion of affected state parties and victims as well as non-directly affected
states, international organizations, and NGOs via amicus curiae.
To rebut the second assumption, it is important to point out that international
courts are often significantly more independent from political decision-making
than constitutional courts. They do not rely on the approval of an electorate and
strategies to constrain their activities, or require high majorities or even
amendments of founding documents that are difficult to achieve. To be sure,
disgruntled state parties might refuse to participate in the proceedings, block the
appointment of judges, attempt to cut the Court’s funding, or decide to withdraw
their consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, often such moves have a
limited effect. Even when one of the two superpowers, the US, withdrew its
consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1985 after the Nicaragua
decision, the ICJ’s survival was not at stake.
Thus, the question is not whether international courts could – or even should
– avoid the adjudication of violent conflicts, but rather how the adjudication can
work in a mutually beneficial way: for the court, for the norms involved, for the
affected states and societies. Just as international courts cannot avoid megapolitical conflicts, the adjudication of mega-politics does not have the same
negative consequences as originally assumed by Ran Hirschl. Following the
guiding questions posed by this special issue, we will focus on the positive
implications of conflict litigation for the underlying dispute (III), the law (IV),
and the political and social consequences (V).

33. See generally Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics and, id., The Judicialization of MegaPolitics, supra note 13 (analyzing the significant reliance on courts to address political controversies).
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III
SLOWING DOWN: TRANSFORMING VIOLENT CONFLICTS INTO LEGAL
DISPUTES
The transformation of violent, mega-political conflicts into legal disputes has
several implications for the underlying dispute. First of all, it is important to point
out that not every inter-state conflict comes before international courts. Indeed,
only a small minority of all inter-state conflicts find their way to The Hague,
Strasbourg, San Jose, Hamburg, or Arusha. Secondly, to initiate legal
proceedings, the complex and highly divisive political conflicts have to be
transformed into legal disputes. This means that they have to adhere to
procedural requirements and frame the substantive questions into the respective
legal regime. Consequently, the political conflict is both disaggregated and
multiplicated at the same time. This means that, on the one hand, the issues
relating to the conflict are separated and divided among several highly
specialized international adjudicative fora, and, on the other hand, the conflict
itself is multiplied in parallel proceedings, each addressing different parts of the
same set of facts.34 For instance, the underlying mega-political conflict between
Russia and Ukraine generated a series of international litigations before various
international courts. While those proceedings were all legally different, they were
part of a wider political strategy to transfer the violent conflict into the legal
realm. In turn, even half-baked victories on the legal battlefield – whether at the
ECtHR, the ICJ, ITLOS, or an ICSID tribunal – are also exploited by political
actors in domestic media and public discourse, thus reaffirming their megapolitical nature.
The procedural requirements of a legal dispute further complicate the
transformation of violent conflicts into legal disputes. The existence of a treaty,
which allows state parties to bring proceedings, is the main hurdle and sometimes
results in creative, but rather fictitious situations in which the judicialization of
major geopolitical conflicts and interstate wars depends on the compromissory
clause in an international human rights treaty.35 By trying to fit the square peg in
the round hole, the real conflict is transformed into a legal-interpretative
34. Thomas Schultz & Niccolò Ridi, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals, 50 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 577, 601–04 (2017) (highlighting comity references when multiple international forums are
adjudicating matters arising from the same controversy); see James Crawford & Penelope Nevill,
Relations Between International Courts and Tribunals: The “Regime” Problem, in REGIME INTERACTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 237 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012) (discussing situations where “cases
operate in parallel, but never meet”). See generally Nikolaos Lavranos, Regulating Competing
Jurisdiction Among International Courts and Tribunals, 68 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L.] 575, 575–621 (2008) (Ger.)
(discussing how to regulate regime problems occurring when multiple international courts adjudicate
issues relating to the same conflict).
35. For instance, on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination in the ICJ case on the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ. Fed’n), Preliminary
Objection, 2011 I.C.J. (Apr. 1), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/140/140-20110401-JUD01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R2G-L9QY].
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question that barely reflects the complex situation. The disaggregation of the
conflict in various legal disputes might encourage forum shopping and enable
various parallel proceedings over several international courts, which can result in
diverging outcomes thus undermining legal certainty.36
However, the initiation of proceedings on violent conflicts before
international courts poses several advantages. First of all, moving a conflict from
the battlefield to the international judicial system is usually a positive
development. It symbolizes a shift in the respective personnel in decision-making,
from the military to lawyers. It also entails the potential to slow down active
hostilities as international adjudication creates international attention. While the
final judgment on the merits takes several years, the possibility of interim
measures or preliminary orders allows international courts to intervene even in
situations of acute violence.37 Pursuing international adjudication could also
prevent the reignition of violence as international courts are non-majoritarian
institutions through which weaker state parties or conflict actors could also
pursue justice, thus favoring a strategy of judicial reckoning over violent attacks.38
Secondly, the judicialization of the violent conflict allows for its processing in
the language of the law. This means that historically fraught and geopolitically
complex situations have to be narrowed down and translated into questions of
procedure and substance according to international treaties. The parties have to
face each other in a common legal vocabulary, which implies often a rhetorical
de-escalation and lack of propagandistic vocabulary, at least in the written
submissions.
Thirdly, the disaggregation of a conflict among several judicial fora delineates
the conflict in several separate judicial proceedings focusing on one element of
the conflict. While this may raise difficulties in addressing the core conflict, it is
also more manageable to address only one legal aspect of the conflict than the
highly complex, politicized, and ultimately destructive political conflict. Again,
we do not expect one international court to settle the dispute between Ukraine

36. See Lawrence Hill Cawthorne, International Litigation and the Disaggregation of Disputes:
Ukraine/Russia as a Case Study, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 779, 814 (2019) (“The fact that the structure
of international dispute settlement can result in the disaggregation of disputes has been presented as both
a blessing and a curse . . . For [some], this disaggregation of disputes carries with it such negative
externalities as forum-shopping, overlapping jurisdiction, and abuse of process.”).
37. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. (Jan. 23), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/17820200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/79RQ-ZQBX]; Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Press Release 377,
Court Grants an Interim Measure in the Case of Armenia v. Azerbaijan (Dec. 16, 2020),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-6889210-9244085 [https://perma.cc/VS38-ADB8].
38. See Mike Corder, Palestinians Ask International Court to Open ‘Immediate Investigation’ Into
Israel, PBS (May 22, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/palestinians-ask-international-court-toopen-immediate-investigation-into-israel
[https://perma.cc/7VJE-WFMJ]
(discussing
Palestine
pressuring the ICC to open an investigation). See also ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou
Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=210303-prosecutor-statement-investigation-palestine
[https://perma.cc/7DBS-JCCX].
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and Russia permanently.39 This is far beyond what an international court can
realistically achieve. However, the parallel proceedings at the ICJ under the
CERD and ICSFT Conventions, at the ECtHR, the ICC, ICSID, and ITLOS
might be able to address some elements of the broader conflict and achieve at
least some type of post-conflict justice and accountability, for instance,
compensation for expropriation, the release of vessels, prisoners’ exchanges, and
just satisfaction for material and immaterial damages. Hence, for the conflict as
such, its transfer from a political-military conflict to a legal dispute before an
international court can be very beneficial.
The transferal of conflicts from the battlefield to the courtroom is a strategy
often pursued by the less powerful. States that only possess inferior political,
military, or economic capacities, international organizations, as well as
individuals, appeal to the international community for judicial intervention. In
recent years, several high-profile cases concerned actions perpetrated by
powerful P5 states such as China,40 Russia, and the UK,41 who have in turn
refused to abide by the respective decisions. This was neither unexpected, nor is
it common for international courts to successfully settle the underlying (geo-)
political dispute. Still, international organizations, states, and individuals
continue to bring such cases to the fora of international adjudication.
International adjudication might be flawed, but it is still an important forum for
raising the international spotlight on a situation of violence, thereby increasing
the pressure to act for the international community. While international courts
cannot evade political questions, they also cannot provide political solutions.
In some instances, the respective proceedings can also be understood as a
form of strategic litigation, as part of a wider diplomatic strategy. An emerging,
but highly interesting development in this regard concerns the initiation of
proceedings by third-states parties, which are not involved in the violent conflict.
The most prominent example is The Gambia which, supported by the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), brought proceedings against
Myanmar for violations under the Genocide Convention. Article IX of the
Genocide Convention allows for state parties which are not directly affected to
bring a case. The case against Myanmar is the first case in the ICJ’s history in
which a third-state not only participated but initiated the judicial proceedings.42
39. See STEERING COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 26.
40. See, e.g., Philippines v. China, PCA Case Repository, 11–12 (Perm Ct. Arb. 2016).
41. For instance, on the Chagos Island, see Mauritius v. U.K., PCA Case Repository 2011-03, 11
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015); Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Island from Mauritius in
1965, Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. (Feb. 25), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/16920190225-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LYL-73X5]; Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary Between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius v. Maldives), Case
No. 28, Order 2021/2 of Feb 3, 2021,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/28/C28_Order_2021-2_03.02.2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4NH-RP7R].
42. See also Michael A. Becker, The Plight of the Rohingya: Genocide Allegations and Provisional
Measures in The Gambia v. Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, MELB. J. INT’L L., Dec. 2020,
at 11 (examining the broader impact of the decision on ICJ practice); Christina M. Cerena, Provisional
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A major factor explaining The Gambia’s exceptional action lies in the country’s
then-attorney general and justice minister Abubacarr Tambadou. Tambadou,
who is an expert in international human rights law and served on the prosecuting
team at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, visited a Rohingya
refugee camp in Bangladesh with a delegation from the OIC in May 2018.43 When
talking to refugees, he “saw genocide written all over these stories” and thus
began lobbying the OIC to take action under the Genocide Convention against
Myanmar.44 The Gambia had just recently undergone a democratic transition in
2017 when opposition leader Adama Barrow took power after 22 years of
dictatorship under former President Yahya Jammeh. The application against
Myanmar thus also indicates The Gambia’s return to the international legal
community and serves to posit the new government as a protector of
international law and core legal norms. This becomes apparent also in the
application of The Gambia to the ICJ:
The Gambia, mindful of the jus cogens character of the prohibition of genocide and
the erga omnes and erga omnes partes character of the obligations that are owed
under the Genocide Convention, institutes the present proceedings to establish
Myanmar’s responsibility for violations of the Genocide Convention, to hold it fully
accountable under international law for its genocidal acts against the Rohingya
group, and to have recourse to this Court to ensure the fullest possible protection for
those who remain at grave risk from future acts of genocide.45

In a similar vein, the Netherlands announced in September 2020 to “hold
Syria responsible under international law for gross human rights violations and
torture in particular”.46 Joined by Canada in spring 2021, the Netherlands plans
to enter into negotiations with the Assad government and, if those are
unsuccessful, to submit the charges to the ICJ under the Convention against
Torture.47 Naturally, those two judicial disputes differ considerably – the
Measures: How International Human Rights Law is Changing International Law (Inspired by Gambia v.
Myanmar), 11 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L L. 34, 57–59 (2021) (arguing that international human rights bodies
often neglect formal requirements of international law when presented with urgent situations that could
lead to irreparable harm); Marco Longobardo, The Standing of Indirectly Injured States in the Litigation
of Community Interests Before ICJ: Lessons Learned and Future Implications in Light of The Gambia v.
Myanmar and Beyond, 24 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (highlighting the history of ICJ
jurisprudence in non-injured state claims); Martin Mennecke, The International Court of Justice and the
Responsibility to Protect: Learning from the Case of The Gambia v. Myanmar, 13 GLOB. RESP. TO
PROTECT 324, 339–44 (explaining the role of the ICJ and the responsibility to protect).
43. Aaron Ross, With Memories of Rwanda: The Gambian Minister Taking on Suu Kyi, REUTERS
(Dec. 5, 2019, 8:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-world-courtgambia/with-memories-of-rwanda-the-gambian-minister-taking-on-suu-kyi-idUSKBN1Y91HA
[https://perma.cc/4P5F-BKHA].
44. Id.
45. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Gam.
v. Myan.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2019 I.C.J. ¶15 (Nov. 11), https://www.icjcij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBN7-74UM].
46. GOV’T OF THE NETH., The Netherlands Hold Syria Responsible for Gross Human Rights
Violations, (Sep. 18, 2020), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2020/09/18/the-netherlands-holdssyria-responsible-for-gross-human-rights-violations [https://perma.cc/TY9N-63L5].
47. GOV’T OF THE NETH., Joint Statement of Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding
Their Cooperation in Holding Syria to Account, (Mar. 12, 2021),
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Myanmar case concerns ongoing violence and human rights abuses and requires
provisional measures, while the Syrian case concerns systematic and widespread
patterns of violence which had been carried out over several years. However,
both cases constitute important, symbolic projects to advance community
interests before international courts. They demonstrate how less powerful states
take recourse to judicial means to slow down the conflict and hold states
accountable for massive human rights abuses in the absence of political or
military actions.
IV
PROVIDING SPACES FOR NORM CONTESTATION: COURTS AS NORM
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The adjudication of violent conflicts can also positively contribute to the
stabilization of international legal norms. In constructivist scholarship, judicial
procedures can be understood as a particular form of norm institutionalization
that shields norms against challenge and provides for specific rules on how to
process contestation. Antje Wiener, for example, emphasizes the role that
institutionalization plays in processing challenges to norms.48 By developing
normative understandings and organizational scripts, institutions limit the range
of acceptable arguments49, thereby civilizing the process of contestation. In such
cases, contestation helps strengthen rather than destabilize norms—assuming
there is a proper framework for deliberating their meaning.50 Courts are a form
of institutionalization that ensures that normative disputes remain within the
confines of the law because rules of procedure and a judge or jury can determine
the appropriateness and legality of claims. Thus, they work as a showstopper to
escalation.51
https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2021/03/12/joint-statement-of-canadaand-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-regarding-their-cooperation-in-holding-syria-to-account
[https://perma.cc/5TXK-B85B].
48. ANTJE WIENER, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION OF POLITICS: CONTESTED NORMS AND
INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS 204–08 (2006); Antje Wiener, Normative Baggage in International
Encounters: Contestation all the Way, in ON RULES, POLITICS AND KNOWLEDGE: FRIEDRICH
KRATOCHWIL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 202, 203 (Oliver Kessler,
Rodney Bruce Hall, Cecilia Lynch & Nicholas Onuf eds., 2010).
49. Nicole Deitelhoff, The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the
ICC Case, 63 INT’L ORG. 33, 44–61 (2009).
50. Adam Bower, Contesting the International Criminal Court: Kenyatta, Bashir, and the Status of
the Nonimpunity Norm in World Politics, 4 J. GLOB. SEC. STUD. 88, 91 (2019).
51. For a similar argument with regard to international negotiations, where institutional
mechanisms such as procedural fairness or the absence of a hierarchy encourage effective arguing, see
generally Thomas Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 15
(2000) (describing how shared institutions or norms can structure interaction); Kathryn Sikkink,
Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD
POLITICS, TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS AND NORMS 30 (Sanjeev Khagram,
James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002) (identifying how communicative power in transnational
advocacy groups can shift norms internationally in the absence of hierarchy); NICOLE DEITELHOFF,
ÜBERZEUGUNG IN DER POLITIK. GRUNDZÜGE EINER DISKURSTHEORIE INTERNATIONALEN

STEININGER & DEITELHOFF (DO NOT DELETE)

110

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/13/2022 1:42 PM

[Vol. 84: 95

How can we apply those insights to violent conflicts? At the core of most cases
of peace and security judicialization stand the most fundamental norms of public
international law. The principles of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty,
the prohibition of aggression, and the attribution of (criminal) responsibility
constitute crucial benchmarks for the behavior of states in the late 20th and early
21st century. They are legally codified in many hard and soft legal instruments and
form part of customary international law; hence, state parties do not usually call
into question their general justification, but disagree on the clear contours of
their application in specific cases.52
The judicialization of norm contestation can affirm normative expectations –
even if it results in withdrawal and backlash of a superpower. The case of
Nicaragua v. United States depicts a critical juncture in the ICJ’s jurisprudence.
In contrast to earlier cases, the application by Nicaragua against the US support
for Contra rebels focused on an ongoing armed conflict against a hegemonic
power. The Court found that the US violated the prohibition on the use of force,
non-intervention, the interruption of peaceful maritime commerce, and was “in
breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed in Managua on 21 January
1956”.53 The US refused to participate in the proceedings, withdrew from the
optional clause system, and later blocked enforcement of the judgment by the
United Nations Security Council. Even though the decision of the ICJ did not
succeed in resolving the conflict, it established the ICJ as an impartial and
authoritative tribunal. Moreover, the judgment also exemplifies the Court’s
function to stabilize normative expectations by “affirm[ing] cardinal norms of
international law – especially the prohibition of the use of force – in the face of
contrary practices by one of the two superpowers at the time. If a court identifies
a breach of law, this fundamentally confirms the validity and strengthens the
normativity of the law.”54 According to Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,
the Nicaragua judgment can even be analyzed as an instance of law-making, as it
provided clarification about the parameters of the normative content “that
construe[s] the international prohibition on using force broadly and the right to
self-defense narrowly. Moreover, the decision established the ban as customary
international law and shaped the accountability of actions by non-state actors.”55
Similarly, contestation of ICC operations on the African continent might
have weakened the court’s effectiveness and legitimacy on the continent but it
safeguarded and even strengthened the international criminal law regime. The
REGIERENS 306 (2017).
52. Nicole Deitelhoff & Lisbeth Zimmermann, Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of
Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms, 22 INT’L STUD. REV. 51, 57 (2020).
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 137 (June 27), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/70/070-19860627JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V7Q-JQ4J].
54. ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 10 (2014).
55. Id. at 12.
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ICC experienced contestation of its operations on the African continent from the
very beginning, mostly centered on the meaning of complementarity. The
contestation increased dramatically once the situation in Darfur had been
referred to the court by the UN Security Council without the consensus of Sudan
in 2005 and with the issuing of an arrest warrant for then-president Omar al
Bashir in 2008. The investigation by the court regarding post-election violence in
Kenya in 2007 and 2008 fueled this contestation, a case activated on basis of the
proprio motu powers of the ICC prosecutor. The Kenyan authorities questioned
the arrest warrant of the ICC for then-Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta, stating
that the case was inadmissible because of the principle of complementarity.
Similarly, they argued that the court would endanger peace and security in
Kenya. Finally, in 2013 after Kenyatta had been elected as president of Kenya,
the Kenyan government, seconded by the African Union, argued that charges
against the two were inadmissible because they enjoyed immunity under
international law.56
While none of these arguments could convince either the Court, the
Assembly of State Parties, or the UN Security Council, contestation on the
African continent intensified further. States as well as non-state actors
increasingly framed the Court as an anti-African court.57 In turn, cooperation
with the court began to decrease and several African states even initiated their
withdrawal from the statute, including South Africa, the Gambia, and Burundi.
While only Burundi effectively withdrew from the court in the end, the Kenyan
election investigation marked a clear line of radicalization of contestation of the
court on the African continent.58 Nevertheless, this contestation has not
necessarily weakened the international criminal law regime. In fact, it supported
further legal institutionalization by fueling national and regional efforts in
building up judicial institutions and procedures to be able to take over these
cases, such as the decision by the African Union to establish an African Court of
Justice and Human Rights. So, the two cases are not judicial failures.
As we highlighted above, courts should not be seen merely as arbiters of
conflict but equally as spaces for norm contestation in which the applicability and
validity of legal norms can be disputed, rejected, or refreshed. When viewed in
this perspective, the court does not fare as bad. In both cases, the affected
countries have strengthened their legal systems to be able to challenge the court
concerning complementarity — even when they ultimately failed. Moreover,
both states were also forced to position themselves towards the norm set of
individual criminal accountability. Finally, with the view on the broader
institutional scene, the initiative of the African Union to create an African Court
56. African Union, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC),
AU Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, 91 (Oct. 12, 2013).
57. Charles Chernor Jalloh, The African Union, the Security Council, and the International Criminal
Court, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA 211 (Charles Chernor Jalloh & Ilias
Bantekas eds., 2017).
58. Nicole Deitelhoff, What’s in a Name? Contestation and Backlash Against International Norms
and Institutions, 22 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 715, 723 (2020).
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of Justice and Human Rights points in the direction of strengthening legal
commitments on the African continent. Hence, the court has succeeded in
upholding normative commitments. However, while this does address the norm
set of individual criminal accountability as a whole, it does not do so with regard
to the immunity of sitting heads of state. The proposed African Court of Justice
and Human Rights will not be able to try sitting heads of states, and the exit of
first member states will probably prevent the court from new attempts to press
charges against sitting heads of states in the near future. The ICC has already
signalled its reluctance against prosecuting siting heads of state, as evidenced in
the 2019 initial decision of the pre-trial chamber II on the situation in
Afghanistan. There, the Court denied the prosecutor the authorization to initiate
a prosecution because it would not serve the interests of justice.59
Norm contestation might not only provide an opportunity to clarify and
develop normative commitments but can also concurrently strengthen the
institutional authority of courts.60 Even for courts with weak institutional
authority, adjudicating situations of conflict provides them with publicity and
agency. The transfer of fundamental social conflicts to international courts allows
them to intervene in norm conflicts over the meaning and application of torture,
enforced disappearances, sexual violence, as well as the legal responsibility for
those acts such as head of state immunities and amnesties. While courts might
have good reason to refrain from pronouncing a verdict in those delicate
questions of international law — the ECtHR has just recently pronounced in the
case of Georgia v. Russia (II)61 that it is not competent to adjudicate acts during
five days of hostilities as those would fall in the realm of international
humanitarian law — being involved in high-profile post-conflict cases might also
boost institutional authority.
The most prominent example in this regard is the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. The Court, which was established in 1979 rose to prominence in
the aftermath of military dictatorships, civil wars, and genocide. With only ten to
fifteen cases per year, the Court’s case law has established milestones for
situations of post-conflict justice, starting with Velásquez Rodrígues v. Honduras,
its first case ever in 1988,62 which has become a landmark decision targeting
59. Prosecutor v. Counsel for the Defense, ICC-02/17, Decision on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in Afghanistan, ¶ 41 (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF [https://perma.cc/TG4A-LWWM]. Yet, the
Appeal chamber amended this decision in 2020 arguing the pre-trial chamber had incorrectly applied the
“interest of justice” criterion. See Prosecutor v. Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, ICC-12/17 OA4,
Judgement on the appeal against the decision on the authorization of an investigation into the situation
in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 46 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.PDF [https://perma.cc/SB98-CH5X].
60. This is usually called “de-facto authority.” See generally INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY
(Karen Alter, Mikael Rask Madsen & Laurence R. Helfer eds., 2018) (examining the de facto authority
of the ICC and its justifications).
61. Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, ¶ 336, (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-207757%22]} [https://perma.cc/9P68-Y3LQ].
62. Rodrígues v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 20 (July 29,
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enforced disappearances. Crucially, the Court has not shied away from
confronting those questions, even including far-reaching and systematic remedies
for victims of violence. This culminated in decisions such as Barrios Altos63 and
La Cantuta v. Peru,64 in which the Court pronounced amnesty laws not
compatible with regional human rights standards and strengthened the right to
truth.65 Those decisions did not lead to a breakdown of the Court but essentially
contributed to putting the Court on the map. In other words, it established the
Court as a body that confronts the violent past of many of its state parties while
providing an honest and transparent forum for victims of massive human rights
abuses. While states have struggled to implement the judgments, and thus a pure
compliance-oriented measurement of institutional authority remains
unsatisfactory, the Court was able to expand its visibility, profile, and authority
throughout the region. This allowed the Court to stretch and reinforce its position
even more, peaking in Gelman v Uruguay.66 There, the Court reaffirmed that the
Uruguayan amnesty law is incompatible with the ACHR even though the
respective law had been passed and subsequently reaffirmed twice by a
democratic referendum. Ultimately, the IACtHR’s case law was instrumental in
establishing the anti-impunity norm67 and providing global standards for holding
states accountable, while also creating a strong role for the Court in regional lawmaking68 and establishing itself as a central forum for many victims of violent
conflicts in the region.69 While those examples cannot be easily transposed to
other regional contexts, as the experience of the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights has demonstrated, they pose important counterexamples to
reflect on the role of international courts in violent conflicts. In particular, they
bring us to consider another underexplored function of international courts in
situations of violent conflict: creating trust.

1988).
63. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 44 (March 14,
2001).
64. La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 226 (November 29,
2006).
65. Klaas Dykmann, Impunity and the Right to Truth in the Inter-American System of Human Rights,
7 IBEROAMERICANA 45, 58 (2007).
66. Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, ¶
232 (Feb. 24, 2011).
67. Karen Engle, A Genealogy of the Criminal Turn in Human Rights, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, 15, 21 (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller & D. M. Davis eds., 2016).
68. Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
12 GER. L.J. 1203, 1213 (2011). But see Jorge Contesse, The International Authority of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: A Critique of the Conventionality Control Doctrine, 22 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1168,
1168 (2018) (highlighting the actions of the court as establishing itself as a constitutional court to the
detriment of its international authority).
69. Luis van Isschot, Assessing the Record of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Latin
America’s Rural Conflict Zones 1979-2016, 22 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1144, 1148 (2018); see also Carlos
Martìn Beristain, Diálogos Sobre la Reparaciòn. Experiencias en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos (2008), Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 1–678.
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V
ENABLING TRUST: INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AS A MECHANISM TO
CREATE TRUST IN A SITUATION OF CONFLICT
Finally, the international adjudication of violent conflict also has wider
political and social consequences. In particular, we argue that judicialization of
peace and conflict can also be understood to create and sustain trust among
states, victims, and within the broader legal community. We define trust as an
actor’s judgment of other actors’ or institutions’ “motivation and competence to
act in his or her interests” and not to exploit one’s cooperation.70 International
Relations scholarship has devoted significant attention to the problem of trust in
international relations.71 In particular, it has stressed that inter-state trust is an
essential element of the peaceful resolution of disputes.72 Repeated interaction,
for instance, among diplomats in several rounds of negotiations, fosters
cooperation and enhances the mutual understanding of actors as honest and
moral collaborators. The existence of trust is thus not a prerequisite. Instead,
trust is mutually co-created among engaged participants and can thus transform
violent conflicts. Peace-building activities should thus be mindful of fostering
trusting relationships between adversaries.73
Trust and trustworthiness cannot only be nurtured among states, but also visà-vis institutions.74 This means that trust might influence how non-state actors,
such as civil society or victims of human rights abuses, perceive international law.
When parties decide, for example, to take a contentious dispute to the Hague for
conflict resolution, they are trusting the system. However, the object of trust can
be varying. For example, trust can manifest itself in the superior legal position or
better argumentative strategy, in the reciprocal behavior of the adversary, in the
70. Mark E. Warren, What Kinds of Trust Does a Democracy Need? Trust from the Perspective of
Democratic Theory, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST 33, 33 (Soinja Zmerli & Tom W.G. van der
Meer eds., 2017). See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (2004) (examining
standard theories of trust and advocating for the view of trust as “encapsulated interest”).
71. See Aaron M. Hoffman, A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations, 8 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 375, 375 (2002) (examining a series of measures to more accurately identify trusting relationships);
Torsten Michel, Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International
Relations, 19 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 868, 868 (2013) (criticizing the dominant framework of trust scholarship
and advocating for greater focus on the emotive aspects of trust). See generally KEN BOOTH & NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER, THE SECURITY DILEMMA: FEAR, COOPERATION AND TRUST IN WORLD POLITICS (2008)
(arguing that insecurity can be ameliorated through institutions and norms); Brian Christopher Rathbun,
Trust in International Relations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST (Eric M.
Uslaner ed., 2018) (arguing that certain types of trust are vital for maintaining features of international
relations); Torsten Michel, Trust and International Relations, in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2016) (highlighting various conceptual overviews of trust scholarship in
international relations).
72. See generally BRIAN C. RATHBUN, TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND AMERICAN MULTILATERALISM
(2011) (examining the social psychological theories of trust and their implementation in multilateral
international organizations).
73. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trust-Building in International Relations, 4 PEACE PRINTS: S. ASIAN J.
PEACEBUILDING 128, 134 (2012).
74. HARDIN, supra note 70, 17–23.
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independence of international adjudication, or in the idea of peaceful dispute
settlement. While studies have shown that diplomacy can effectively create trust,
further empirical research on international courts is required. What is important
for the mega-politics discussion, however, is that by initiating a dispute before an
international court, an actor is strategically signaling its trustworthiness to the
international community to allow for the inclusion of international courts. This
shows a very different dimension of mega-political adjudication.
Against this background, we argue that international courts have essential
institutional features to create the communicative dynamics for trust-building.75
In contrast to ad-hoc diplomatic initiatives or special tribunals, permanent
international courts such as the ICJ, the ICC, and the regional human rights
courts have established bureaucratic frameworks and procedures.76 As has been
demonstrated in the first part of this article, they can also circumvent a possible
political blockade in the UN Security Council and intervene on behalf of the
international community. Their judges generally are well-respected persons of
high moral calibre,77 which can also engage in judicial diplomacy.78 For instance,
the IACtHR has developed the idea of a “traveling court”, which regularly holds
sessions away from its seat in Costa Rica to engage with particular countries
directly, and meet with state authorities as well as victims and other civil society
associations.79 Moreover, in contrast to external diplomatic initiatives,
international adjudication often features judges or arbitrators who are nationals
from or appointed by the respective parties. This can help to defuse allegations
of interventionism.
There are several ways international courts can use those institutional
features to create trust in a situation of violent conflicts. First, international courts
can act as mediators. As we have highlighted above, international courts act as a
third party not directly involved in violent conflict and the crimes committed
therein and thus as a kind of mediator. International courts, in this sense, might

75. See Low Lucinda et al., Closing Plenary: Building Trust in International Law and Institutions,
111 PROC. ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 325–46 (2017) (describing the panel discussion with
contributions by Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, Judge Bruno Simma, Maurice Kamto, and Philip
Alston).
76. See Cosette D. Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, Trust in the Court: The Role of the Registry
of the European Court of Human Rights, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 665, 672–74 (2019) (reviewing the
frameworks and procedures acting as controls in the ECtHR).
77. However, this could also pose a challenge to the development of trust. See Hélène Ruiz Fabri,
Conflict of Interests and International Adjudication: Trust at Stake, 113 PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING 222,
223 (2019) (explaining that parties sometimes prefer adjudicators with a conflict of interest because a
conflict may indicate an adjudicator’s subject-matter expertise).
78. See Theresa Squatrito, Judicial Diplomacy: International Courts and Legitimation, 47 REV. INT’L
STUD. 64, 68 (2021) (highlighting the widespread practice of judicial diplomacy throughout various
international tribunals).
79. Pablo Saavedra, the Secretary of the IACtHR, has developed the narrative of the “robes and
backpacks” to describe the IACtHR’s regular practice of entering the field and visiting the states and
communities of the hemisphere. See also Silvia Steininger, Creating Loyalty – Communication Practices
in the European and Inter-American Human Rights Regimes, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
(forthcoming).
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become ‘repositories of trust’,80 where state counsels, which are often highranking diplomats and legal scholars,81 meet on neutral ground. By transforming
violent conflict into legal dispute, courts provide conflicting parties with a shared
language and common procedures that help them stabilize expectations about
each other’s intentions and provides for guidance as to the course of action. While
some states have refused to appear before international courts,82 the general rate
of participation is very high.83 By appearing before international courts, states
send out a signal of good faith and commitment to international law, as well as
the system of dispute settlement. The accompanying slowing down of action helps
the conflicting parties to distance themselves from the actual conflict and to
(re-)consider alternative means of conflict resolution.
Secondly, international courts can also contribute to establishing a historical
record of the conflict. They often engage in fact-finding in the adjudicative
process, thus not only identifying the respective actions of state authorities but
also documenting historical, social, and geopolitical contexts.84 International
courts lend their authority to external UN fact-finding missions, and their
findings can create a new, more impartial history of the conflict.85 In particular,
the extensive historical records provided for by international criminal courts have
been invaluable resources for victims and their right to truth.86 The establishment
of such ‘collective narratives’ versus conflict-supporting narratives by the
respective parties is a prerequisite for the establishment of trust and cooperation
in transitional justice.87
80. See Herbert C. Kelman, Building Trust Among Enemies: The Central Challenge for International
Conflict Resolution, 29 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL RELS. 639, 645–46 (2005) (introducing the concept of
‘repositories of trust’).
81. See Shashank P. Kumar & Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing before the International
Court of Justice, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 839, 897, 908 (2014) (demonstrating empirically that a majority of
lawyers appearing before the International Court of Justice were either academics or government
lawyers).
82. Peter Tzeng, A Strategy of Non-Participation before International Courts and Tribunals, 19 LAW
& PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 5, 6–8 (2020) (chronicling the history of states refusing to participate
in international court proceedings).
83. Id. at 7.
84. See Moshe Hirsch, The Role of International Tribunals in the Development of Historical
Narratives, 20 J. HIST. INT’L L. 391, 399–403 (2018) (describing the role international tribunals play in
constructing collective memories by engaging in fact-finding inquiries). See generally JAMES GERARD
DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2016) (examining the
way in which the International Court of Justice engages with facts).
85. This does not mean that the “history writing” by international courts is not contested. See Barrie
Sander, The Method is the Message: Law, Narrative Authority, and Historical Contestation in International
Criminal Courts, 19 MELB. J. INT’L L. 299, 314–33 (2018) (illustrating three examples where ‘history
writing’ by international courts is contested).
86. But see, e.g., Fergal Gaynor, Uneasy Partners – Evidence, Truth and History in International
Trials, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1257 (2012) (examining how jurisdictional and evidentiary rules often
serve to create an incomplete historical record); Aldo Zammit Borda, History in International Criminal
Trials: The ‘Crime-driven Lense’ and Its Blind Spots, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 543 (2020) (analyzing the
limitations that a crime-driven lens may have on a historical record).
87. Elizabeth Wilke, Paul K. Davis & Christopher S. Chivvis, Establishing Social Conditions of Trust
and Cooperation, in DILEMMAS OF INTERVENTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR STABILIZATION AND
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Thirdly, court interventions signal responsibility for committed crimes, which
might contribute to the development of trust from victims. While alternative
mechanisms such as truth commission or amnesties are equally helpful in
managing trauma arising from conflict experiences and in furthering
reconciliation, the involvement of criminal courts affirms the legal individual
responsibility of perpetrators. Hence, the international criminal tribunals, the
ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC in particular, pioneered addressing and including the
victims of international crimes, giving them an individual standing and a chance
to see justice at least for the respective crimes.88 The ICC, for instance, created a
victim’s fund so that compensation payments for victims could be issued even if
the convicted would not have the financial resources. The Trust Fund for Victims
also implements projects funded through fines and forfeitures of convicted
persons as well as voluntary donations by state parties and individual donors. In
March 2021, the ICC judges ordered compensation of 30 million USD to the
victims of convicted war criminal Ntaganda in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.89
However, international courts more often fail than succeed in generating
justice for victims of crimes given the enormous obstacles to international and
extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning the access to and protection of evidence
and witnesses. Victims are often frustrated because the court cannot take account
of all crimes and the respective victims given its narrow mandate and resources,
a problem that was particularly evident in the Lubanga case at the ICC in which
crimes of sexual violence were sidelined.90 Finally, reparations are often
dependent on the trust fund which does not have the volume to satisfy all
requests.91 Yet, reparations are not the only available instruments to create trust
among victims.
International courts also allow for the active involvement of victims in the
adjudicative process, allowing them to speak their truth to the international
audience and face those responsible for their suffering. In particular, when
national courts and post-conflict instruments have been unable or unwilling to
provide justice, recourse to international courts remains the last resort for victims
of armed conflict. Naturally, the deep trauma of war and violence requires
international judges to undertake oral examinations with heightened sensitivity.92
RECONSTRUCTION 187, 215–16 (Paul K. Davis ed., 2011); DANIEL BAR-TAL, INTRACTABLE
CONFLICTS: SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND DYNAMICS 1440–43 (2013).
88. Luke Moffett, Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International Criminal Court, 13 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 281, 282–84 (2015).
89. Prosecutor v. Ntagand, ICC-01/04-02/06, Reparations Order, ¶ 247 (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01889.PDF [https://perma.cc/NGQ5-7DVR].
90. Rachel Killean & Luke Moffett, Victim Legal Representation before the ICC and ECC, 15 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 713, 718, 731 (2017).
91. Kelisiana Thynne, The International Criminal Court: A Failure of International Justice for
Victims?, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 958, 979 (2009).
92. See Behnam Behnia, Trust-Building from the Perspective of Survivors of War and Torture, 78
SOC. SERV. REV. 26, 29–36 (2004) (highlighting the steps necessary for professionals to establish trust
with victims of war and torture).
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This can create tensions, for instance, most recently at the IACtHR, in the case
of Jineth Bedoya Lima and Other v. Colombia. Following an hour-long, highly
emotional testimony of journalist Jineth Bedoya who was abducted, raped, and
tortured during a prison visit in 2002, the Colombian representative accused the
judges of lack of impartiality and requested their recusal. Yet, the Court rejected
the allegations, highlighting that “empathy with the alleged victim and the
formulation of an interrogation that is comfortable, safe and that provides
confidence, as well as the elimination of spaces of re-victimization, are concrete
obligations of the judges” (own translations).93
Finally, with regard to the international legal community, the primary
function of court intervention is to uphold normative commitments by judging on
violations. When courts intervene, they force conflicting parties to justify their
action with reference to legal principles and agreed-upon norms. Doing so should
re-activate the commitment of the conflicting parties to these norms. Equally, it
signals to the international community as a whole that certain commitments are
upheld.94 Additionally, such interventions can also be instrumental in identifying
aspects in need of legal attention and norms in need of refinement. This is the
logic of legal application discourses: They re-affirm commitment to norms and at
the same time spur the further development of legal norms.95 All in all, court
interventions thus are a primary means to increase certainty in the international
legal community about the validity of legal principles and norms. From a trust
perspective, compliance with norms and judgments is thus not of immediate
interest. Trust in the proceedings of international courts does not necessarily
equal trust in the respective outcome.
VI
CONCLUSION
In the bulk of rationalist scholarship, the intervention of international courts
in violent conflicts is perceived at best as irrelevant to the conflict at hand and at
worst as a cause of further destabilization and violence. In institutionalist
scholarship, the judicialization of mega-political issues is generally seen as a
threat to the institutional authority of courts and the political community alike.
Ran Hirschl argues that the transfer of mega-political issues from the realm of
political debate to judicial decision-making creates the risk of ‘political courts’ in

93. Caso Bedoya Lima y Otra vs. Colombia, Procedural Outcome, Motion Granted, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 431 (Aug. 26 2021); see also Mariela Morales & Silvia Steininger, Once More on Judicial
Resilience: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Responds to the Revictimizing Challenge of
Colombia in the Case of Jineth Bedoya Lima and Other, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 1, 2021),
http://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/01/once-more-on-judicial-resilience-the-inter-american-court-of-humanrights-responds-to-the-revictimizing-challenge-of-colombia-in-the-case-of-jineth-bedoya-lima-andother/ [https://perma.cc/4JAJ-VQJU] (documenting the oral proceedings before the Court).
94. See Daase & Deitelhoff, supra note 19, at 499.
95. See generally KLAUS GÜNTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS: APPLICATION
DISCOURSES IN MORALITY AND LAW (John Farrell trans., 1993).
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the domestic sphere.96 Recent research on international courts adopts a similarly
negative outlook. Both the literature on backlash97 as well as on judicialization98
highlights the challenges of international courts with respect to highly contested
domestic issues.
For violent conflicts as a prototype of mega-politics that we address in our
contribution, both lines of research have highlighted possible negative
externalities of international court involvement. However, the adoption of a
mega-political lens for international courts paints a more mixed picture, as their
involvement can contribute to resolving, advancing, or exacerbating the
resolution of the dispute. International courts cannot refrain from interfering in
political conflicts because they were designed to do exactly that. In an at best
semi-constitutionalized political order like the global one, courts are a prime
means to uphold and communicate shared norms and procedures in peace and
security. In this sense, we argue that judicial intervention is not only necessary
but also desired to uphold the normative commitments underpinning the
international legal order. Moreover, court intervention in violent conflict can
have positive effects with regards to the course of the conflict – for both victims
and the international community.
Judicialization transforms the conflict into a concrete legal dispute, which
disaggregates the conflict into various legal forums. This allows the fighting
parties to refer to a shared language and common procedures, which helps reduce
uncertainties between the parties and creates a common horizon for conflict
management. Slowing down the conflict helps conflict parties to leave the fog of
war and reflect on alternative means of conflict resolution. Additionally, it buys
time for domestic and international groups and institutions to work on conflict
resolution.
Judicialization is also one of the very few possibilities to give the victims of a
conflict international legal standing. Where national redress and institutions of
transitional justice fail or are absent, international courts may help victims to
overcome their trauma from conflict and the crimes committed therein by
identifying individual responsibility and accountability. Providing for reparation
and truth-telling, as even courts with low institutional authority such as the
IACtHR and the ICC can do, is another means to achieve this.99

96. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics, supra note 13, at 107–12.
97. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against
International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L J.
L. CONTEXT 197–220 (2018) (investigating the different reasons nations across the world are resisting
international courts).
98. See generally Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Laurence R. Helfer, Theorizing the
Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 449–63 (2019) (theorizing the ways that
judicialization instills power in litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers).
99. See Christian Marxsen, Introduction in CRISTIÁN CORREA, SHUICHI FURUYA & CLARA
SANDOVAL, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, in MAX PLANCK TRIALOGUES ON THE LAW OF
PEACE AND WAR (2020) 1–15.
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Finally, with regard to the international legal community, judicialization is a
means to communicate and reactivate normative commitments and identify areas
for further development, while providing procedures on how to do so. Courts are
spaces for norm contestation where the members of a legal community can
debate about the necessity, effectiveness, and legitimacy of specific norms and
rules, following shared rules of engagement. This is of utmost importance for the
area of peace and war, where core legal concepts such as intervention or selfdefense are not only vague on principle but consistently in flux.100 The lack of a
unified regime or enforcement body for international humanitarian law further
highlights the crucial role of international courts, particularly human rights
courts and international criminal tribunals, to provide clarification on normative
understandings.101 As such, courts are a means to re-assure each other of shared
commitments.
We are well aware that these effects do not automatically materialize in each
case. Due to procedural requirements, court intervention can often not address
the core conflict item itself and the permanent pacification of a conflict is thus a
rather elusive goal. Judicialization in a situation of post-conflict justice is also
susceptible of further entrenching political, economic, social, or ethnic divides.
Additionally, conflict parties often ignore court rulings or utilize them to mobilize
for their cause. Thus, judgments might clarify normative meanings but still not
succeed in having a deterrence effect.102 Victims are also frequently disappointed
by the limited resources and capabilities of international courts to provide justice.
International courts struggle to process hundreds or even thousands of individual
claims and lack financial resources to undertake fact-finding in a situation of
active hostilities. The disappointing experience of the Special Tribunal for

100. See Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters, Introduction – Dilution of Self-Defence and Its
Discontents, in MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, CHRISTIAN J. TAMS & DIRE TLADI, Self-Defence Against
Non-State Actors, in 1 MAX PLANCK TRIALOGUES ON THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR (2019) 1-13.
101. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya Úbeda de Torres, “War” in the Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 148, 161–62 (2011). See generally Frans Viljoen,
The Relationship Between International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the African Human
Rights System: An Institutional Approach, in CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 303–33 (Erika de Wet & Jann
Kleffner eds., 2014); Karin Oellers-Frahm, A Regional Perspective on the Convergence and Conflicts of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Military Operations: The European Court of
Human Rights, in CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 333–65 (Erika de Wet & Jann Kleffner eds., 2014);
Dinah Shelton, Humanitarian Law in the Inter-American Human Rights System, in CONVERGENCE AND
CONFLICTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS 365–95 (Erika de Wet & Jann Kleffner eds., 2014); Gentian Zyberi, The Jurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in CONVERGENCE
AND CONFLICTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS 395–416 (Erika de Wet & Jann Kleffner eds., 2014).
102. See generally Jacqueline R. McAllister, Deterring Wartime Atrocities: Hard Lessons from the
Yugoslav Tribunal, 44 INT’L SEC. 84 (2020) (arguing that the deterrence effect of international courts is
largely dependent on: “(1) ICT officials . . . secur[ing] prosecutorial support; (2) combatant groups
rely[ing] on support from liberal constituencies; and (3) combatant groups hav[ing] centralized
structures.”).
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Lebanon, which had cost both Lebanon and the international community approx.
970 million USD over eleven years but resulted in only one in absentia
judgment,103 is a warning sign that the establishment of specialized courts can
sometimes do more harm than good.104
Scholars and practitioners have stressed lessons for international courts
adjudicating violent conflicts to improve their legitimacy, effectiveness, and
accountability, mostly focusing on outreach as well as deliberation and dialogue
with domestic stakeholders.105 For instance, Courtney Hillebrecht, Alexandra
Hunneus, and Sandra Borda highlight the judicialization of Colombia’s peace
process:
[It] took the form of a series of dialogues—between the courts and government;
among different actors within the state, such as courts, executive agencies, and the
prosecutors; and among non-state actors such as NGOs, the media, and the
universities—that emphasized the international law and norms of criminal
accountability. (. . .) It is also that the terms of Colombia’s peace were produced
through—not despite—the international courts’ ongoing deliberative engagement
with the peace process. Without the courts’ participation and apparent acquiescence,
the Final Accord would not enjoy the same level of international or domestic
legitimacy, and it would not show the same level of legal sophistication.106

Counterfactual thinking – would it have been better (for the court, for the
norm, for the society) if the issue had never been adjudicated? – does not hold
much promise for international courts in situations of violent conflicts. The
establishment of specific courts and their handling of particular cases is
historically contingent, which means the inclusion or exclusion of international
courts in situations of violent conflict is not predetermined and a different fate of
specific courts and conflicts is possible.107 Yet, the structures of the post-WWII
international legal order, whether during the Cold War, the era of liberal
internationalism in the 1990s, or the return of geopolitics in the 21st century, have
remained surprisingly stable. In the area of peace and security, no more
democratic, accessible, inclusive, and transparent organs than international
courts have been developed. Reimagining whether a particular court, norm, or
society would have benefited from less judicialization thus likely falls into the
103. The Prosecutor v. Ayyash, STL-11-01/T/TC, Judgment (Aug. 18, 2020).
104. See Michael Lysander Fremuth, Andreas Sauermoser & Konstantina Stavrou, The Special
Tribunal for Lebanon: After the Judgment in Ayyash et al., Justice at Last?, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 26, 2021),
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/26/the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-after-the-judgment-in-ayyash-et-aljustice-at-last/ [https://perma.cc/8F8F-Z3N4] (presenting the criminal justice and human rights critiques
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon).
105. See, e.g., JESSICA LINCOLN, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
OUTREACH AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AFTER CONFLICT (2017) (summarizing the
critical link between outreach and achieving the objectives of international courts). But see critically
CHRISTINE SCHWÖBEL-PATEL, MARKETING GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2021) 181–212.
106. Courtney Hillebrecht, Alexandra Hunneus & Sandra Borda, The Judicialization of Peace, 59
HARV. INT’L L.J. 279, 329–30 (2018).
107. See Ingo Venzke, Situating Contingency in the Path of International Law, in CONTINGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF DIFFERENT LEGAL HISTORIES 3–19, 5–8 (Ingo
Venzke & Kevin Jon Heller eds., 2021).
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trap of what Susan Marks described as ‘false contingency’: “For just as things do
not have to be as they are, so too history is not simply a matter of chance and
will.”108
The structures of international law favor the judicialization of violent
conflicts, whether this results from power politics, international liberalism,
institutionalist bureaucracies, or new imperialism. Still, in a global order in which
access to justice and democracy is so unequally distributed like ours, court
intervention might still be the best and, in most instances, the only option.

108. Susan Marks, False Contingency, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 10 (2009).

